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Executive summary 
The Australian Internet Security Initiative (AISI) is a program operated by the 
Australian Communications and Media Authority (the ACMA) to help AISI participants 
address the problem of computing devices that are ‘compromised’ by malware (or 
malicious software). Malware infections enable cyber criminals and state-sponsored 
actors to steal personal and sensitive information from these devices and control them 
remotely for illegal or harmful purposes, without the users’ knowledge. These 
infections often undertake activities that cause harm to other internet users, including 
the mass distribution of spam, hosting of phishing sites and facilitation of identity theft. 
When this research was undertaken, there were 137 AISI members—including 
18 universities—participating in the AISI program. These members receive daily AISI 
reports identifying internet protocol (IP) addresses on their networks observed as 
having malware infections. Members can use the information in the reports to identify 
the relevant customer or user with the malware infected computing device and help 
that customer or user to resolve the problem. 
The ACMA introduced an online AISI portal in 2014 that provides access to more 
information on malware incidents associated with individual IP addresses than is 
contained in the daily AISI email reports. AISI members can download their AISI data 
directly from the portal to either complement or replace the data received in the daily 
AISI email. 
In March 2015, the ACMA began reporting internet services vulnerable to known 
‘exploits’1, expanding the focus of the AISI program to prevention as well as resolution 
of problems.  
The ACMA undertook research with AISI members to help it: 
 assess the effectiveness of the AISI program 
 better understand the measures AISI participants use to help their customers 
resolve computer compromises 
 identify additional information or assistance that participants consider would 
improve the program. 
Personal telephone interviews were conducted with 24 randomly selected AISI 
participants between 23 February 2015 and 27 March 2015. These 24 were selected 
from a stratified list of 82 AISI members who had received AISI reports over the period 
of a few weeks in early 2015. This group was stratified into four subgroups to help 
ensure broad coverage of AISI members in this research. 
                                                     
1 In this context, an exploit is a known vulnerability that enables a cyber-criminal to surreptitiously intercept 
or directly access an Internet connected service, potentially obtaining data and credentials that can be used 
to cause harm to the service owner or user. 
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Table 1: AISI participants interviewed—number interviewed in comparison to 
number of AISI members that received reports 
Type of AISI member (by number of infections reported) No. of completed 
interviews 
Total no. of AISI 
members  
Large ISP (600–5,000 infections reported per day) 5 6 
Medium ISP (21–599 infections reported per day) 5 24 
Small ISP (up to 20 infections reported per day) 9 39 
Educational institution (usually <10 cases reported per day) 5 13 
Total 24 82 
Note: Although randomly selected, the sample size of 24 is too small to be statistically representative of all 
AISI participants. The results in this report provide an indication of how a broad cross-section of small, 
medium and large internet providers and universities use the AISI reports. When observations about 
differences between the various types of internet providers are noted, as with the sample as a whole, these 
observations about subgroups should not be regarded as statistically representative measures. 
Key findings 
Participants’ use of the AISI reports 
AISI reports are the predominant source of data AISI participants use to identify 
malware-infected customers on their networks. For a third of the participants 
interviewed, the AISI reports are their sole source of information identifying customers 
with malware infections. With one exception, all small ISPs interviewed relied solely on 
AISI reports to identify their infected customers. 
The majority of the AISI participants interviewed (22 of 24 participants) reported 
‘acting’ on the daily AISI email reports. While the extent of action varies from 
occasional to daily use of AISI data, most use this data to help their customers in 
some way.  
Participants’ use of the AISI portal 
Only a fifth of the participants indicated using the AISI portal (four large ISPs and one 
small ISP). Some participants were aware of the portal but did not require the 
additional functionality it provides, preferring to receive their AISI information solely by 
email. Overall, AISI participants appeared to have a low level of awareness of the 
portal’s functionality and, in some cases, its existence. Based on these responses, the 
ACMA plans to work to improve the level of awareness of the portal and its additional 
functionality and benefits.  
Current processes to deal with the data in the AISI reports 
A third of the participants interviewed—mostly large and some of the medium ISPs—
indicated having automated or semi-automated processes in place to deal with the 
data provided in the daily AISI report. (These processes enable a non-manual 
correlation of the IP address data in the AISI reports with the provider’s customer 
information.) Two-thirds of participants—mostly small ISPs and educational 
institutions—currently process this information manually. Some of the participants 
interviewed, mostly medium ISPs, are considering developing automated processes. 
Educational institutions and small ISPs advised that manual processing of AISI data is 
not a problem for them, as they generally only receive a small number of reports.   
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Actions to inform and help customers deal with malware infections  
AISI participants deal with the information they receive on malware infections affecting 
their customers, and provide support and assistance to them, in a variety of ways. The 
most common approach is to notify their customers of their compromise and advise 
how the problem might be resolved. This is usually achieved via an initial email, while 
some providers notify their customers by phone.  
Participant responses on the extent of feedback received from customers about a 
malware infection report varied—some rarely receive feedback and others never 
receive feedback. This is especially true for those participants using an automated 
system. For those who do receive customer feedback, its nature is mainly positive—
most customers appreciate being informed of their malware infection and the support 
provided by the ISP to address the issue. 
Other sources of information about malware infections 
While a third of the participants (seven out of 222) rely solely on the AISI reports for 
information about malware infections, for two-thirds of respondents these reports are 
not the sole source of data to detect and prevent malware infections. 
Utilising the data in the daily AISI reports does not present major difficulties, according 
to interviewed participants. Many have integrated the reports into their internal 
systems and automated processes, showing the importance of keeping report formats 
consistent. When asked about possible improvements to the AISI program, 
participants mentioned the provision of more detailed information and changes to how 
it is delivered, to either facilitate automated systems or improve customers’ direct 
access to information on malware infections. One large provider suggested that the 
delivery of the AISI information be enhanced to enable customers to directly access 
information about their malware infections.  
Changes to cybersecurity and related customer assistance in the last two to 
three years 
Most participants have undertaken continuous changes to or refinements of their 
system in the past two to three years, since the previous AISI research undertaken in 
2012. A quarter of participants indicated there had been no changes, while four 
participants had started using the AISI reports and were positive about them. One ISP 
said: 
Before the AISI, we didn’t have anything in place; we dealt with problems on [a] case-by-
case basis; and we did this only if a customer brought a problem to our attention. 
The AISI is great for us because we can help our customers. (Small ISP) 
Another small ISP said: 
We are now using AISI, and because we use AISI we now have a policy to detect and 
prevent malware and botnet viruses. Previously to receiving the AISI reports, we were just 
monitoring high upload usages on the customer network.  
Reporting significant cybersecurity risks to external authorities 
All of the large ISPs interviewed have regular to occasional contact with CERT 
Australia (Australia’s national computer emergency response team). However, 
medium and small ISPs, and education institutions, have limited contact with 
                                                     
2 Out of the 24 ISPs interviewed, two mentioned not currently receiving the AISI reports. 
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government organisations and are uncertain about which is the appropriate 
organisation to whom they should report cybersecurity incidents. 
Organisations mentioned as appropriate to report cyber incidents to include AusCERT 
(a non-government organisation), the Attorney General’s Department, the Australian 
Federal Police, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the ACMA. Most 
participants, however, consider they have not had a need to report any incidents. 
Participants interviewed suggested possible improvements in how government helps 
providers and customers with malware infections. Some large ISPs commented on the 
need to consolidate the number of agencies dealing with cybersecurity. Other 
suggestions were about providing and sharing information on malware infection 
threats for industry and education programs for citizens.  
Conclusion 
Based on the interviews conducted for this research, participant ISPs value the AISI 
highly. While a number of possible improvements are suggested, which the ACMA will 
consider, the AISI clearly plays a central role in how many ISPs manage malware. 
Given this research shows a wide variation in the extent to which ISPs use AISI data, it 
is likely that this data could be used more broadly in the ISP industry to manage 
malware threats. 
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Introduction 
The AISI is a program operated by the ACMA to help internet and communications 
providers address the problem of ‘compromised’ computing devices. 
The main activity of the AISI is to obtain data and report information that participants 
can use to identify customers on their networks with computing devices compromised 
by malware (or malicious software). Its aim is to enable AISI participants to reduce the 
harm malware infections cause to individuals through the loss of personal and 
sensitive information, and to contribute more broadly to the reduction of spam and 
other e-security compromises. Participants are expected to advise customers that they 
may have a compromised computing device, and to provide them with information to 
help them address the problem. 
The research presented in this report examines how various AISI participants who 
receive those compromised computer reports act on that information to help protect 
the integrity of their customers’ computing devices and their own communications 
networks. 
In conducting this research, the ACMA was interested to understand participants’ 
perspectives on the operation of the AISI, how effective the program is and how it 
might be improved. 
Background 
The AISI was one of the world's first anti-botnet initiatives. It is removed from the 
ACMA's regulatory activities, and instead relies on partnerships between the ACMA 
and industry to facilitate better cybersecurity among Australian users. The AISI has 
grown and evolved—from an initial six participants, 137 participants were involved at 
the time of the research, including 119 ISPs and 18 universities. These organisations 
are estimated to cover more than 90 per cent of Australian residential internet users. It 
has also expanded—from initially reporting only a few variants of malware, there are 
now more than 750 malware types listed in the AISI database. 
More recently (commencing during the period this research was conducted), the AISI 
has begun reporting vulnerabilities affecting internet services such as webservers and 
routers. The AISI is now regarded as providing one of the most extensive pictures of 
the extent of malware infestation on Australian internet services, and has recently 
been used for this purpose in the Australian Cyber Security Centre's 2015 Threat 
Report. 
Participation in the AISI is voluntary and free-of-charge. Organisations are eligible to 
receive AISI reports if they have their own allocated IP ranges. Most organisations 
participating in the AISI provide internet and associated communications services to a 
range of customers. 
The AISI operates alongside the iCode— a voluntary cybersecurity code of practice—
that places an emphasis on detection of malware infections in ISPs’ networks and 
draws attention to the AISI as a means of doing so. The iCode was developed in 2010 
by the Internet Industry Association in consultation with the ACMA and government. 
On 24 March 2014, responsibility for the ongoing development and oversight of the 
iCode was taken over by Communications Alliance, and an updated version of the 
code was released in August 2014. 
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The iCode provides guidelines to help ISPs provide consistent messages to their 
customers when they receive AISI infection reports or otherwise identify infected 
computing devices on their networks. Information about educating customers and 
reporting ‘malicious activity’ to appropriate authorities is also detailed in the code. 
Acting on AISI reports involves informing customers they may have a compromised 
computing device and helping them to resolve the problem. Whether any action is 
taken, and the degree to which action is taken, is at the discretion of the individual 
provider. Similarly, customers are not required to take action in response to the advice 
of a malware infection from their provider unless not taking action contravenes their 
provider service agreement.  
Previous AISI research 
This research updates and builds on research into the AISI conducted in late 2011 and 
early 2012 with participating ISPs and educational institutions.  
This research, The Australian Internet Security Initiative—provider responses to 
security-compromised computers: Interviews with industry participants, undertook 
in-depth interviews with a sample of 24 AISI members, in different Australian states, 
including small, medium and large internet providers, and universities.  
The research identified how providers act on malware reports and help customers to 
resolve malware problems.  One finding from this work was strong support from ISPs 
for the ACMA to develop an AISI portal. The portal was introduced in 2014 and the 
2015 research includes questions about the use of the portal and possible 
improvements. 
Diversity of AISI participants 
AISI participants represent a diverse and extensive range of internet and 
communications service providers. Most are ISPs and, along with other 
communications providers, offer a range of services that include website hosting, 
server hosting, cloud computing, online business networks, subscription and 
on-demand television or video, as well as telephone, data, video and mobile 
communications. Their customers encompass residential, business, government, 
university staff and student users. 
Characteristics such as the type and size of service providers and the resources 
available to them help determine how providers use the AISI information and their 
capacity to help customers. 
Information provided to AISI participants 
Through the AISI program, the ACMA provides information and advice to AISI 
participants, along with data reports that identify compromised customer computing 
devices.  
The following information about the AISI program is available: 
 access to a list of AISI participants. The list of AISI participants is provided in 
Appendix 1. 
 three charts, updated daily, on malware infections and service vulnerabilities 
observed on Australian networks.  
AISI reports 
As part of the AISI, the ACMA emails daily reports to registered internet providers 
where compromises have been found on the IP ranges assigned to their networks. It is 
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the providers’ responsibility to inform the ACMA of any changes to their IP range 
assignments. Providers can also access this information through the AISI portal rather 
than by email. 
The daily reports identify the number of unique infections detected for each AISI 
participant since the previous report (data older than 72 hours is not included), a list of 
infected IP addresses, the corresponding name of the malware type and additional 
information on the infection where this is available from the source supplying data to 
the ACMA. This information has generally been reported to the ACMA in the previous 
24 hours.  
Extensive ‘vulnerable service’ data was introduced into the daily AISI reports on 
13 March 2015 (during the period of the interviews), with some interviewees 
responding positively to this initiative.3 
Appendix 2 provides examples of these daily reports. 
AISI reports are compiled from a broad range of data sources from the global 
cybersecurity community. Currently, over 30 discrete data feeds are utilised for AISI 
reporting, received from 13 different entities, including the Shadowserver Foundation 
and Microsoft.  
The data feeds are carefully analysed before they are utilised for AISI reporting. Some 
feeds contain multiple malware or service vulnerability types and often only some of 
these types are reported from these feeds. A high premium is placed on only reporting 
reliable data to ensure the integrity of the program and because considerable expense 
may be involved in seeking to remediate an infection. Many of the data sources the 
AISI uses are not readily available to providers or ISPs as data providers prefer to deal 
with one national organisation in providing this information. 
While the AISI program utilises a comprehensive set of data, it does not identify all 
forms of compromises or service vulnerabilities affecting Australian internet users. The 
number of compromises existing on Australian networks but not reported through the 
AISI is unknown. 
AISI online portal 
After a soft launch in mid-2014, an AISI portal was formally launched in November 
2014. This portal provides access to a more comprehensive set of data than is 
contained in the daily AISI reports. For example, a given IP address may have 
numerous reports of a malware type over a 24-hour period—in cases where there is 
no new information about that malware infection, only the most recent report is 
included in the daily AISI email.  
The portal enables providers to perform granular searches on the different network 
elements associated with malware infections and vulnerable services, such as all 
observations over a given date period that utilised a local port of 14646 (or any other 
local or remote port where this data is available from the AISI data feed). The portal 
currently contains approximately 16 months of AISI data and 233.3 million 
observations.  
Appendix 3 provides an example of the information available on the AISI portal. 
                                                     
3 Post-fieldwork (on 25 May 2015), the ACMA transferred this vulnerable service data into a separate daily 
AISI email report due to the different nature of this data. 
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Nature of the malware problem 
The deployment of malware has interrelated harmful consequences for service 
providers and internet users. Computing devices compromised through the 
surreptitious installation of malware can be controlled remotely for illegal and harmful 
purposes without the user’s knowledge. These compromised devices are often 
aggregated into large groups (known as botnets) that are used to assist the mass 
distribution of spam, the hosting of phishing sites and distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks on websites. A number of providers interviewed deal with DDoS 
attacks and spamming activity that adversely affects their network performance and 
availability. 
For individual internet users, the main harmful consequences arising from malware 
infections are the theft of personal and sensitive information from their infected 
computing devices. This information can then be used for multiple purposes, such as 
enabling banking and identity fraud and extortion. A trend in recent years has been the 
installation of ‘ransomware’, where a malware infection causes files on a computer 
(and potentially connected network drives) to be encrypted. The computer owner must 
pay a ransom to decrypt these files.  
Quantitative research undertaken by the ACMA in 2013 with 1,500 Australians aged 
18 years and over indicated that nearly one-fifth of Australian internet users (18 per 
cent) don’t have sufficient protective software on their home computer.4 Another 
10 per cent (1.46 million users) have no protection at all, while eight per cent 
(1.12 million users) don’t regularly update their software. 
                                                     
4 ACMA, Malware and harmful software—consumer views on software threats and use of protections, 
October 2013.  
  acma  | 9 
About the research 
Research with AISI participants was undertaken to help the ACMA refine the AISI 
program. The aim was to better understand what measures participants use to help 
their customers resolve malware compromises, and any additional information or 
assistance that participants consider would enhance the program. 
Research methodology 
Personal telephone interviews were conducted with 24 randomly selected AISI 
participants between 23 February and 27 March 2015. These 24 were selected from a 
stratified list of 82 AISI members who received compromised computer reports from 
the ACMA in early 2015. The interviewed AISI members were stratified into four 
subgroups to help ensure broad coverage of AISI members in this research (see 
Table 1). 
Interviews were undertaken and this report written by staff from the ACMA’s Research 
and Analysis section.  
Research issues 
The views of a cross-section of AISI participants were sought to understand: 
 use of, and action taken on, the daily AISI reports and/or data downloads from the 
AISI portal 
 other methods and practices providers use to deal with malware infections that 
affect their customer/user network 
 actions taken to inform and help customers deal with malware infections detected 
on their computer/s 
 whether these cybersecurity and related customer assistance practices have 
changed in the last two or three years (since AISI research from early 2012) 
 the nature of customer feedback after they are contacted about malware incidents 
 reporting of significant cybersecurity risks to external authorities 
 improvements to the AISI and additional government assistance that may help deal 
with malware and other cybersecurity threats. 
Details of the research methodology and sampling are provided in Appendix 4. 
Limitations 
The research does not address in detail the extent to which internet providers use AISI 
data to combat malware and help their customers. It also does not assess to what 
extent internet providers follow the guidelines in the voluntary cybersecurity code of 
practice, the iCode. 
researchacma 
Our research program—researchacma—underpins the ACMA’s work and decisions as 
an evidence-informed regulator. It contributes to the ACMA’s strategic policy 
development, regulatory reviews and investigations, and helps to make media and 
communications work for all Australians. 
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researchacma has five broad areas of interest:  
 market developments  
 media content and culture  
 social and economic participation 
 citizen and consumer safeguards  
 regulatory best practice and development.  
This research contributes to the ACMA’s social and economic participation research 
theme. 
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Main findings 
This section presents the results of 24 telephone interviews undertaken with a 
selection of AISI participants. They are indicative of the ways internet providers 
respond to the information they receive about customers’ malware infections. 
Where relevant, observations about differences between the various types of internet 
providers are noted. As with the sample as a whole, these observations about 
subgroups should not be regarded as statistically representative measures. 
The main themes identified for the research are reflected in the presentation of 
findings. 
Use of, and action taken on, daily AISI reports and/or 
data downloads from the AISI portal 
The majority of the AISI participants interviewed reported acting on the daily AISI 
reports received by email (22 of the 24 participants interviewed).  
A representative from a small ISP mentioned not being aware of the daily AISI report 
received by their organisation.5  
More differences were evident in the use of the AISI portal by AISI participants 
(launched in mid-2014). Only a fifth of the participants indicated having used the AISI 
portal (four large ISPs and one small ISP). Other participants were either aware of it 
but not using it (two medium ISPs, one small ISP and education institutions), or not 
aware of it. The most common reason given for not using the portal by those aware of 
it was the preference for daily email reports as these were processed by the provider’s 
ticketing system. It was considered easier to receive data via this mechanism than to 
retrieve information using the portal.  
Participants in the research had a mix of manual and automated processes in place to 
deal with the information in the daily AISI reports. A third (three large ISPs, two 
medium ISPs and one small ISP) have automatic or semi-automatic processes in 
place, while two-thirds (three medium ISPs, seven small ISPs and five educational 
institutions) currently manually process the information.  
                                                     
5 The ACMA’s experience is that this happens not infrequently—personnel change and information about 
the AISI report is not passed over to new staff. To address this issue, the ACMA encourages internet 
providers to use generic email addresses that can be accessed by multiple staff. 
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Table 2: Summary of use of daily AISI report and AISI portal, by type of ISPs 
Type of ISP Using daily AISI reports Using AISI portal Automated or manual process 
Large ISP 3 4; 1 aware but not 
using 
3 automated or semi-automated; 
1 under consideration6 
Medium ISP All (5) 2 aware  2 automated, 3 manual 
Small ISP 8 (1 not aware) 1 using; 1 aware 1 fully automated; others manual 
Educational institution All (5) none All manual 
How providers deal with malware infections that affect 
their customer/user network 
A third of the participants (seven out of 22) who use the AISI reports rely solely on 
them for information about malware infections affecting customers on their networks. 
Small ISPs are more likely to rely solely on AISI reports—all small ISPs interviewed 
except one rely solely on AISI reports for this data. 
For two-thirds of respondents, the AISI daily reports were not the sole mechanism to 
identify and help prevent malware infections affecting their customers. Other sources 
of malware infections mentioned were AusCERT reports, reports generated by 
automated in-house abuse detection systems, AOL and Yahoo reports, and specific 
packages dealing with malware detection and alerts. All participants use spam and 
email filtering solutions.  
Table 3: Other sources used to detect malware infections, and use of spam 
and email filtering solutions 
Type of ISP Use of other sources to detect malware Use of spam and email filtering solutions 
Large ISP All All 
Medium ISP 3 solely AISI; 2 other sources All  
Small ISP 4 solely AISI; 5 other sources All 
Educational 
institution 
All All 
                                                     
6 One large ISP had previously developed an automated system to process AISI ‘repeated sightings’ reports, 
which were discontinued in mid-2014. It has yet to update its system to process data either from the AISI 
portal or in the daily AISI reports. 
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Actions taken to inform and help customers deal with 
malware infections  
Participants use a variety of approaches to address the problem of compromised 
computing devices, both in terms of processes in place and level of assistance 
provided to customers. 
Almost all participants have processes in place to address compromised 
computer problems with customers 
With very few exceptions, participants indicated they use the information in the daily 
AISI report to deal with malware infections on their customer networks, albeit to 
varying degrees. Some ISPs only make limited use of the AISI; others are more 
proactive, taking some form of action to inform their customers of the malware 
infection and help them fix the problem.  
For example: 
 A typical approach involves notifying customers of the compromise and providing 
information about how it might be resolved. This is usually achieved via an initial 
email, while some providers make this initial contact by phone.  
 Some ISPs are concerned that passing on information to customers may confuse 
them. They simply let customers know they have been affected by malware and 
ask them to contact the providers’ customer service centre. 
 Some participants do not notify their customers and just suspend or restrict 
accounts as a way to encourage customers to contact the provider. 
 Some participants only contact a customer when repeated incidents occur.  
Notifications of malware infections and sources of support and information for 
customers 
In order to prevent viruses from infecting their customers’ devices, participants use a 
range of approaches to inform and help customers deal with the risk of malware 
infections. Most large and medium ISPs provide general information on internet 
security on their website, with questions and answers on different security topics, and 
terms and conditions for use of their networks. 
Another source of customer information is the ISP’s customer service or technical 
support teams. These teams provide help over the phone to affected customers, 
including reference links and sites with more information on how to resolve and 
prevent malware infections.  
The nature of the assistance provided can vary depending on whether the customer is 
a residential or business user. Participants indicated that business customers tend to 
require less support than residential customers as they have their own IT teams to 
deal with the malware infection.  
Participants seem to use different strategies in terms of how much information from 
the AISI malware report they pass on to their customers, as well as the timing and 
handling of these notifications. Some participants do not pass on all the AISI report 
information to customers in order not to confuse them. They prefer to just advise the 
customer of the malware infection and ask them to contact the customer service 
centre for further information.  
  14 | acma 
Some participants only send notifications to affected customers if an incident is 
repeated: 
We look for repetitions, trends over a number of days. It makes more sense to focus on 
incidents that continue to show up on the reports—usually it corresponds to customers with 
no anti-virus protections or out-of-date protections. (Large ISP) 
For residential customers, there are a lot of reports, and it is challenging for us to action all of 
the reports, but we definitely look at the ones that are repeat offenders.’ (Medium ISP) 
Some participants do not notify their customers, and just suspend or restrict their 
account to get them to react and call the customer service centre.  
Customers are encouraged to respond to notifications in two ways:  
 asking customers to call back the provider in response to an email informing them 
that their service has been affected or restricted  
 making a follow-up call to customers if it appears the malware infection has not 
been resolved—in these cases, providers may impose a limit of three email 
notifications or phone calls made to customers, after which they consider it the 
customer’s responsibility to resolve the issue. 
Varying degrees of help in remediating malware infections 
The level of assistance participants provide to customers varies greatly, from limited to 
considerable: 
 A number of participants provide considerable assistance and support to residential 
customers, and small and medium-sized business customers.  
Support is most often given directly over the phone and involves taking customers 
through the necessary steps to resolve a particular problem—for instance, the 
process of installing or updating and running antivirus software. Those participants 
indicated they try to give as much assistance as possible over the phone. 
The last resort is usually to recommend the customer takes the computer to a 
professional IT technician, with some participants having a list of trusted IT experts 
for referral.  
 Some participants indicated that medium and large business clients require little 
assistance from them to resolve malware infections. These clients generally have 
internal IT assistance to rely on and there is an expectation that, after notifying 
these clients about the computer compromise, the client will be able to fix the 
problem. 
 Some participants only provide minimal assistance to residential customers, 
instead placing primary responsibility for fixing the problem on the customer. A 
common approach by these participants is to provide a generic email informing 
their customer that they have a malware infection, with a recommendation that they 
resolve the problem with antivirus software. In cases where the customer is unable 
to resolve the malware problem, it is recommended that they use the services of a 
professional IT expert. 
Examples of provider approaches to customer assistance  
 For customers who continue to have an infection for a period of one month, one 
provider follows up its emails with telephone contact and claims to get ‘100 per 
cent resolution’ through this process. They supplement this approach with an alert 
that provides ‘a page popping up on their screen informing them there may be a 
problem and asking them to contact us’. 
 A university said that it has multiple approaches depending on the category of 
client (server administrator, staff member or student). For students, it disables their 
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account, then sends out IT support staff to help remove the infection. This 
university also noted:  
In a lot of cases, it may be international students with a wrong [i.e. non-genuine] 
version of Windows. We provide it [a genuine version of Windows] to them for $12 with 
free anti-virus. (University) 
 One university locks out access to its network if the malware has not been 
removed after three reports: 
We send an email to the contact with advice on how to get rid of it. Sometimes it gets 
ignored. We lock after three times in a row if it gets ignored.’(University) 
 One small service provider has the following process:  
 after informing customers, they follow up in 48 hours to ensure action is 
being taken 
 if no action has been taken in seven days, they suspend the service 
 if they receive notification that customers are receiving repeated incidences 
of malware, they shut down the service. 
Different approaches to residential and business customers 
Some ISPs treat business/corporate customers and residential customers differently 
and separately: 
We have two key customer service teams that manage malware infections: 
business/corporate and residential. As a general thing, malware infections are significantly 
lower for business/corporate customers than in the residential market. Direct contact is made 
with corporate customers; they are handled a higher level of support than residential 
customers. (Medium ISP) 
Another medium ISP takes a different approach: 
We offer limited assistance; we provide advice; we make suggestions about what steps to 
take; we offer limited technical support. The assistance offered is the same for residential 
and business customers. However, the majority of business customers tend to have their 
own internal IT assistance, so we don’t really to do much for them. For residential, we offer 
more assistance.’ (Medium ISP) 
One small ISP does not treat residential and business customers differently: 
We don’t really treat residential and business customers differently. An email is sent to 
affected customers, and if they want to contact us, they can. They then get verbal advice 
over the phone. We can send scanning programs to them; if the customer has no idea, we 
suggest they see a computer expert. Some customers may think our email is a spam. We 
don’t provide SMS notifications. Most of the time, people do call back.’ (Small ISP) 
Another small ISP takes a different approach: 
We treat customers differently. We provide a wholesale service to a number of customers. 
For these customers, we solely on forward the AISI reports. For users with our managed 
service—generally business customers—we provide a full clean up service to remove the 
malware infection and have managed plans that can take responsibility of updating security 
software on behalf of the customer. (Small ISP) 
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Recent changes to cybersecurity and related customer 
assistance  
Participants were asked about changes to the cybersecurity and related customer 
assistance practices that had occurred in the past two to three years (since the 
previous AISI research was undertaken in 2012). 
Most participants have undertaken continuous changes to, or refinements of their 
systems, while a quarter have made no changes. Four participants have started using 
the AISI reports and are happy with the information they provide. One ISP said: 
Before the AISI, we didn’t have anything in place; we dealt with problems on [a] case-by-
case basis; and we did this only if a customer brought a problem to our attention. The AISI is 
great for us because we can help our customers. (Small ISP) 
Another small ISP indicated: 
We are now using AISI, and because we use AISI, we now have a policy to detect and 
prevent malware and botnet viruses. Previously to receiving the AISI reports, we were just 
monitoring high upload usages on the customer network. (Small ISP) 
Examples of changes include: 
 continuing refinements in IT security systems for improved detection and 
prevention 
 improvements in how information is relayed to customers 
 the provision of more technical assistance 
 improvements in the education of staff and customers on security issues. 
One participant, while not changing their level of customer assistance, has found it 
easier to help customers affected by malware infections because the AISI reports now 
provide more information.  
A medium ISP has become better at relaying information to customers: 
We are taking these issues of malware infections more seriously in the past three years and 
we provide more technical assistance. Generally, we offer a better customer service with 
resolving the issues quicker and with less hassle. (Medium ISP) 
Prospective future changes that ISPs mentioned are mostly ways to further automate 
or consolidate their existing processes.  
Educational institutions have mostly had to respond to external changes to the security 
environment with an increase in capacity.  
Distributed denial of services (DDoS) have been ramping up and required us to expand in 
terms of capacity. We have had to hire extra consultants. (Educational institution) 
Educational participants are also faced with some specific challenges, for example, 
students using their own devices on campuses: 
‘A large number of users are bringing their own devices. This makes it more difficult to 
manage malware infections. Users have to handle malware infections themselves. We 
provide information and advice.’ (University) 
Two providers commented on an increase in DDoS attacks and expending additional 
resources to deal with these. 
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Customer feedback following contact about malware 
incidents 
AISI participants do not systematically receive feedback from customers in response 
to malware reports—some rarely receive feedback and others never. For those who 
do, the nature of the feedback appears to be generally positive; customers are mostly 
grateful for being informed of the malware infection and any support from the ISP.  
Given this diverse customer response to reports of malware infections on their 
services, the ACMA intends to conduct research into home users’ experience of 
malware infection and what level of assistance they receive in dealing with the 
infections. 
Asked about the nature of this feedback, a medium ISP indicated: 
Most people are deliriously happy. 99 per cent of the customers are happy to hear about 
problems. They want to be good network citizens and they want the issues resolved. 
(Medium ISP) 
When questioned about customer responses to malware reports, one large ISP said:  
Overwhelmingly, customers tend to be quite grateful and happy to be contacted—especially 
with the DNS Changer—as many customers are not technically knowledgeable. Customers 
simply had no idea that this infection/virus was on their system.7 (Large ISP) 
However, three of the large ISPs interviewed believe customers don’t like being 
contacted—even to be notified they have been affected by malware infection.  
Participants described customer attitudes to the notification of malware infections as 
ranging between disbelief, hostility and resentment that the ISP monitors their data; 
appreciation that the ISP is helping them; or simply wanting to be left alone. 
Participants indicated there are very few unresponsive customers. Being able to 
represent the AISI malware report as originating from an official government source 
helps to address some of these reactions, as it enhances the legitimacy of the 
communication.  
Small ISPs and educational institutions mentioned most uncooperative customers tend 
to be Mac users because of the perception these devices aren’t affected by malware 
infections.  
Reporting significant cybersecurity risks to external 
authorities 
Tracking cybersafety incidents 
Participants were asked if they keep records and track information on malware 
infections on their networks. However, few could provide information about tracking—
data is not available for large ISPs and for some of the medium ISPs. And few of the 
AISI participants who provide information appear to track whether a particular malware 
infection is resolved, or the general level of malware infections on their networks. 
                                                     
7 Prevalent in 2011 and 2012, the DNS Changer malware was used to redirect infected users to fraudulent 
domains by hijacking the user’s DNS settings. After taking action against the malware perpetrators, the FBI 
facilitated the ongoing operation of the DNS servers used by the malware so that infected users could 
continue to have internet access. These servers were turned off on 9 July 2012. The ACMA and AISI 
participants mounted an extensive campaign to warn and help infected users to address the infection before 
this date. 
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Some participants use their ticketing system to track information about malware 
infections. However, not all participants with a ticketing system in place use it to track 
data and report on malware infections.  
Reporting significant cybersecurity incidents to external authorities 
Participants were also asked if they report significant incidents affecting their networks 
to any external authorities.  
All of the large ISPs have regular to occasional contact with CERT Australia. One 
medium ISP is in contact with AusCERT, the Attorney General’s Department and 
ASIO. Only one small ISP has contacted any government organisation—both CERT 
Australia and the AFP. Two educational institutions have also reported cybersecurity 
incidents to CERT Australia and the AFP. 
There seemed to be some confusion about which government organisation 
participants should report a cybersecurity incident to. Small ISPs cited a range of 
organisations—the AFP (two ISPs), the ACMA (three), AusCERT (one). Medium ISPs 
most often mentioned AusCERT and CERT Australia. 
It is not clear whether respondents understand the distinction between the roles of 
CERT Australia and AusCERT: 
 CERT Australia is the official national Computer Emergency Response Team and a 
government organisation. It helps protect Australians and Australian businesses 
against cyber-based threats and vulnerabilities.  
 AusCERT is the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team based at the 
University of Queensland and is a non-government organisation. It operates within 
a worldwide network of information security experts to provide computer incident 
prevention, response and mitigation strategies. 
Improvements to the AISI and additional government 
help to deal with malware and other cybersecurity threats 
All internet providers interviewed were asked if they could identify any improvements 
to the AISI program, the daily AISI reports or the AISI online portal. 
Participants are satisfied with the current AISI email reports 
Generally, participants are satisfied with the current AISI reports and email 
notifications. While the information is basic, the reports meet their needs. 
One large ISP commented favourably that the formatting of the AISI report has 
remained consistent over time. Such consistency is important as a number of 
providers have integrated the reports into their internal systems and developed 
automated processes to identify customers and generate standard malware 
notification emails.  
Participants also commented that the information in the AISI report is getting richer, 
with more explanations of specific events and details, and a greater range of 
cybersecurity incidents targeted. This enables them to make their messaging to 
customers more consistent and detailed: 
We are happy with the AISI report. The formatting of the AISI reports is consistent which is 
good. The information is getting richer. There is more explanation of specific events and 
details per event. [Also, the report has changed in the last month or so.] The details provided 
in the reports make our messaging to customers more consistent and fuller also. (Large ISP) 
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Some participants are ambivalent about introducing more detailed information about 
the malware infection in the AISI incident reports. Although extra information is good 
for the customer, one large ISP is concerned that approaching customers about a 
malware infection without overwhelming them with detail is a delicate balance. Two 
other participants (medium ISPs) worry the information in AISI reports could be too 
technical for customers to understand. 
Generally, participants view the malware infection information in the AISI reports as 
appropriate. The few that have experienced some issues would like additional 
information or information not currently covered in AISI reports. However, some of the 
information mentioned as lacking in the current AISI reports—that is, identification of 
spam-sending computing devices and infected routers—is often provided.  
Suggested improvements to the AISI program 
When asked to identify possible areas of improvements for the AISI program, 
participants identified two main areas: 
 the provision of more detailed information 
 the format of the reports or how information can be accessed.  
Provision of more detailed information 
One large ISP has difficulties reconciling all the data to all customers. 
We are not able to reconcile all of the data to all customers (port issue). (Large ISP) 
Two large ISPs noted that having the source port information in the reports is critical, 
but this information is not always available in the reports.8 In cases where there are 
many network users behind a given IP address, the source port can help identify the 
individual computing device that is infected. 
ACMA comment: The source port information is often, but not always, available to the 
AISI. In cases where it is available, this information is always included in the AISI 
email reports.  
A small ISP mentioned: 
Daily AISI report[s] could be improved by providing more up-to-date time stamps. Some of 
the reports have a time stamp from a few days prior. 
ACMA comment: The AISI provides time stamps accurate to the second. However, the 
reports may include malware infection observations identified in the preceding 
72 hours not previously reported to the internet provider (which will be the most 
recent data available to the ACMA).  
The same provider also queried if there might be a way to check if the malware 
infection reported has been removed when the time stamp is from a few days ago. 
                                                     
8 The source port, along with the transport protocol (such as TCP or UDP), uniquely identifies the 
communications endpoint that has sent the IP traffic on which the AISI report is based. In this context, the 
source port reported, together with the public IP address reported, could be used to search through logs 
pertaining to the infected device (for example Netflow data) to find the private IP address of (and thereby 
identify) the specific infected device. 
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Another small ISP recommended that the AISI portal indicate when a report is 
completed, so the ISP knows the problem is resolved. 
ACMA comment: The portal contains a tag system and participants could use this 
facility to identify resolved problems themselves if they wish to do so. If the IP is not 
reported again for that customer, it can be inferred there is a strong likelihood their 
device is no longer infected. For the problem to be marked resolved in the portal, the 
customer must inform their ISP they have removed the infection and for the ISP to 
indicate this in the portal.   
Some educational institutions suggested adding more information or commentary in 
the report on what infection/malware/spam is affecting its users, to decrease the time 
needed to communicate and research the malware infection internally. For 
universities, having an authoritative source to rely on when they pass on the 
information to IT support internally or to their users would be helpful and save time. 
ACMA comment: The ACMA will consider such an enhancement. 
One university suggested some trending analysis may be useful to provide historical 
information on the malware infection when staff go on leave. 
ACMA comment: The AISI portal provides historical trend information.  
Changes to the format of the reports or how information can be accessed 
One small ISP was interested in being able to automate its system so emails can go 
directly to affected customers; for example, a .csv file or an excel file to upload to a 
server. 
ACMA comment: The ACMA has been considering providing .csv reports and 
.csv-formatted files for download from the AISI portal. An issue, however, is 
maintaining consistency for ISPs who have already developed automated procedures 
for processing the AISI data. A possible solution is to offer numerous formats to 
maintain continuity of services for all providers. The ACMA will consider such an 
enhancement. 
A couple of participants suggested making information on the latest malware infections 
available for customers to access directly from the AISI portal. This included the 
recommendation for a more user-friendly, self-help website that would enable 
customers to search for more information on specific malware infections they had 
been notified about. 
ACMA comment: The ACMA will consider such an enhancement. 
Rather than a portal, another ISP suggested having a consumer web system that 
gathers information directly from the web service into a threat management system. 
One ISP commented that the AISI portal does not appear to keep up with changes in 
the AISI reports, and it would be good to update the AISI website with the most current 
information from the reports. 
ACMA comment: The AISI subsection of the ACMA website contains information on 
the top five malware infections currently being reported with a brief description of 
these. This information is updated every day.  
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Some ISPs suggested that additional information and documentation be available from 
the ACMA that the ISP could attach to emails to affected customers—for example, a 
two-page document with information about the malware infection, spam protection 
programs and other basic recommendations.  
ACMA comment: Under consideration. 
Suggested improvements to how government helps deal with malware 
infections 
When asked for how government help with malware infections could be improved, 
outside of the AISI reports, two large ISPs suggested consolidating the number of 
agencies dealing with cybersecurity incidents: 
The number of agencies that deal with cybersecurity issues can be confusing. (Large ISP) 
There is a real lack of government coordination on cybersecurity and public messaging in 
this area [the way government assists malware infections]. (Large ISP) 
These ISPs point to the desirability of a whole-of-government approach to coordinate 
information and activities. 
ACMA comment: Greater coordination of government responses to cybersecurity 
issues is a particular focus for the Australian Cyber Security Centre. The government 
is currently conducting a Cyber Security Review that is examining further 
mechanisms to promote coordination of government cybersecurity efforts. 
There was also a concern that government and industry are not sufficiently preparing 
for the future—for example, potential cybersecurity breaches affecting smart fridges 
and smart cars. Participants in the research also commented that more could be done 
to share information—for example, for government to provide analysis of upcoming 
malware risks. The ACMA will consider the possibility and opportunity to provide 
further information and analysis on upcoming risks through the AISI portal. Providing 
information on upcoming malware infection threats would allow ISPs to manage and 
prepare for major attacks before the problem gets too big. One medium ISP and one 
education institution suggested this could be delivered in the form of a monthly report 
or newsletter.  
One educational sector provider called for an anti-DDoS mechanism to be put in place 
for the sector to mitigate large-scale DDoS attacks. It is noted that DDOS mitigation 
services are readily available from commercial providers.  
Other suggestions for improving how government addresses malware infections 
related to education programs9 and information: 
 One ISP suggested further education and awareness-raising programs for citizens 
about malware risks and cyber-attacks.  
 Another ISP recommended more resources be made available on where 
customers go to find information on malware infections, and how to prevent and 
resolve them.  
                                                     
9 As noted above, the Communications Alliance iCode also contains information and recommendations for 
internet service providers about educating their customers in how to prevent and respond to malware 
infections. 
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 One ISP asked to receive some form of feedback from government on serious 
malware infections, particularly on what has been done and the outcomes 
achieved.  
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Improving the AISI 
The research has identified a number of possible ways to improve the AISI. The 
ACMA will actively consider all of these.  
Information is regularly provided to AISI participants about the operation of the AISI—
including disclosing the sources of AISI compromise data (where permitted by that 
source) and the expected actions of the AISI recipients. However, a number of 
participants appeared to not be entirely familiar with, or to have misperceptions about, 
the content of the AISI reports or portal. 
One area of improvement for the ACMA to consider is to provide additional user-
friendly information on the AISI website for AISI participants and customers—such as 
individuals and small businesses—in the form of frequently asked questions. This 
would include items such as how the data is captured, how customers are affected 
and what information the AISI is unable to provide.   
Another related suggestion from AISI participants was to have a self-help website, 
where affected customers could learn what to do to prevent and address malware 
infections, access more information on specific malware infections and search for 
incidents. While the ACMA agrees this information would be beneficial to customers, 
the fast pace of change of malware infections means that providing comprehensive 
definitive advice is challenging. The ACMA will look at ways to provide more detailed 
and helpful information on malware infections, which may include linking to other 
government sites containing this information. 
Another suggested improvement was for the AISI portal to enable instant and 
automated queries from the AISI data. For example, when a customer rings a 
customer care service with a query, the service staff member could send an 
automated query to the AISI portal to determine whether that customer has had any 
recent malware incidents. This development would require considerable resources to 
implement and will be considered as part of future portal development activities. 
Some AISI participants feel there is insufficient information about particular AISI 
infection types in the AISI section of the ACMA website, which currently only describes 
the most prevalent types of malware infections. Potentially, the ACMA could consider 
enhancing the AISI section of its website or the AISI portal to contain more detailed 
information about the infection types currently being reported through the AISI. 
However, given there are over 750 malware types identified in the ACMA database, 
and new types are constantly emerging, this would be very resource-intensive to 
maintain.  
It is beyond the ACMA’s current resourcing capability to provide comprehensive 
information about all the malware infections it reports through the AISI (many of which 
have numerous and constantly changing variants). There are also numerous 
customer-related variables that affect the effectiveness and accuracy of any advice 
given, such as different operating systems, computing devices and home network 
configurations. As noted above, however, the ACMA will look at ways to provide more 
detailed and helpful information on malware infections. 
The ACMA is currently considering the best way to provide a standardised set of 
information to AISI participants (standardised messaging from ISPs about malware 
infections is also something the iCode aims to provide). The ACMA aims to publish a 
one- to two-page document that would provide links to websites such as Stay Smart 
Online, some general information about what to do about malware infections and 
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information about emerging risks. This would be made available on the AISI portal for 
ISPs to use as they choose.10 In the past, similar information was provided to AISI 
members through occasional emails. 
Among the possible improvements identified as a result of the research, the ACMA is 
considering the addition of frequently asked questions about the AISI as a priority, as 
this appears likely to deliver the most immediate benefits to AISI members.  
Next steps  
In 2015–16, the ACMA is also considering undertaking research on customer 
perceptions of malware notifications and experiences in responding to malware alerts 
from providers. This would, for the first time, give the ACMA a comprehensive 
understanding of the experiences of the end-user beneficiaries of the ACMA’s anti-
malware program. This research will provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
the effectiveness of the AISI program and actions taken by internet providers to inform 
their customers about malware infections. 
                                                     
10 The ACMA has now included an AISI update section in the portal that contains some information about 
particular malware or vulnerability types reported through the AISI. See Appendix 3 for a screenshot. 
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Appendix 1—List of AISI 
participants 
Current participants as at September 2015. 
AAPT Limited 
Access Net Pty Ltd 
Ace Internet Services 
Activ8me 
Adam Internet 
AINS 
Albury Local Internet 
Pty Ltd 
Amnet 
AOL 
Apex Internet  
Asian Pacific 
Telecommunications 
ATU Internet Group 
Aussie Broadband 
Aust Domains  
AUSTARnet 
BarNet 
Bekkers 
Bendigo Community 
Telco 
BigAir Group 
Limited   
BKB Internet 
Brennan Voice and 
Data Pty Ltd  
Catholic Education 
Network 
Catholic Network 
Australia 
Centorrino 
Technologies Pty Ltd  
Central Data   
Chariot CI Internet 
Cirrus 
Communications 
Cloud365 Australia 
ClubTelco 
Comcen 
Conetix Pty Ltd  
Connectivity I.T 
CQ University 
CSIRO  
Daraco Services  
DCS Internet 
Deakin University  
Dedicated Servers 
Digital Pacific Pty Ltd  
Dodo Australia 
Dreamtilt 
earthwave 
ECN Pty Ltd  
Edith Cowan 
University 
EFTel  
Enterprise IP  
EscapeNet 
e-wire connection 
point 
Exetel Pty Ltd 
Flinders University 
Fortana Networks 
Australia  
FoundationIT 
Foxtel Broadband 
GCOMM 
Global Dial 
gotalk 
GoWireless  
GPLHost Networks 
Pty Ltd 
Grapevine 
HaleNET 
Highway 1  
Hotkey  
HugoNET 
IDL Internet 
iiNet  
Indigo Pty Ltd  
Internet Information 
Group  
Internode 
Inticon 
IntraPower   
Ipera 
Communications 
iPrimus 
iseek 
KDDI Australia   
La Trobe University 
Legion Internet 
M2 
Telecommunications  
Macquarie Telecom 
Matilda Internet  
Melbourne IT 
Micron21 
Monash University 
Montimedia 
Murdoch University 
MyNetFone  
Neighbourhood 
Cable 
Net Logistics Pty Ltd 
Net Niche Pty Ltd  
Netbay Internet 
Netspace 
Netspeed 
NetYP   
NewSat 
Nexon Asia Pacific  
Nextep  
NICTA 
NSW Office of State 
Revenue 
Nuskope Pty Ltd 
Oceania Business 
Solutions Pty Ltd 
On Q Networks 
OntheNet  
Optus Internet 
Orion Satellite 
Systems 
Over The Wire Pty 
Ltd 
Oz Servers Pty Ltd 
  26 | acma 
Pacific Internet 
(Australia) 
PingCo Pty Ltd 
Planet Ozi  
PPS 
Internet/StudentNet 
Seccom Global 
Servers Australia 
SkyMesh 
Somerville 
Soul 
Communications 
Speedweb Internet  
Spin Internet  
Spirit Telecom 
State Library of 
Victoria  
Swinburne University 
of Technology  
Tas Communications 
Telstra Bigpond 
(The) Australian 
National University  
(The) Galaxy 
GateWay Computer 
System 
(The) Smelly Black 
Dog Company  
(The) University of 
Adelaide 
(The) University of 
Melbourne 
(The) University of 
New South Wales 
(The) University of 
Newcastle 
(The) University of 
Western Australia 
TPG Internet 
Uecomm  
University of 
Wollongong  
Unwired 
UQconnect 
Velocity Internet 
Virgin Broadband 
vividwireless 
Vodafone Hutchison 
Australia 
WAnet 
West Australian 
Networks 
Westnet 
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Appendix 2—Example of AISI 
daily report  
Dear AISI Participant, 
This report is generated by the Australian Communications and Media Authority's 
Australian Internet Security Initiative (AISI) service. 
Below is today's list of open, compromised and malware infected hosts on your 
networks.  For help interpreting this report, please contact <aisi@aisi.acma.gov.au>. 
Messages sent to the sender/from address of this email will be summarily ignored. 
All URLs contained within the report should be treated as hostile and capable of 
infecting a user with malware without their knowledge.  As such 
URLs have been deliberately broken to prevent against accidental infection. 
Please disclose any data provided which identifies the remote computer on a need-to-
know basis only. Public or other unnecessary disclosure of such data may lead to, for 
example, pollution of sinkhole data, requiring the sinkhole to be moved. If such data is 
disclosed to customers, please provide this instruction with the data. 
Please note, all timestamps are relative to Coordinated Universal Time (GMT+0) 
--- Report follows --- 
IP  DATETIME  TYPE     NETWORK 
ADDITIONAL 
192.0.2.25 2015-03-23 20:34:05 Malware: Torpig   ISP  
local_port: 55800, remote_ip: 108.61.18.43,  remote_port: 80, domain_name: 
egcwbtwh. com, data: / 
192.0.2.185 2015-03-23 11:52:04 Malware: ZeroAccess   ISP  
protocol: udp, local_port: 17815, remote_ip: 72.196.208.62,  
remote_port: 16470, domain_name: ip72-196-208-62. dc. dc. cox. Net 
192.0.2.106 2015-03-23 22:23:22 Malware: Zeus    ISP  
local_port: 22823, remote_ip: 82.165.37.26,  
remote_port: 80, domain_name: damnpops. com, data: /can/DSC_5870.jpg 
192.0.2.119 2015-03-23 21:31:54 Malware: ZeroAccess   ISP  
protocol: udp, local_port: 51239, remote_ip: 184.187.165.111,  
remote_port: 16471, domain_name: ip184-187-165-111. sb. sd. cox. Net 
192.0.2.108 2015-03-23 18:38:03 Malware: Torpig   ISP  
local_port: 42292, remote_ip: 108.61.18.43, remote_port: 80, domain_name: 
egcwbtwh. com, data: / 
192.0.2.202 2015-03-22 08:35:48 Malware: ZeroAccess   ISP  
local_port: 58800, remote_ip: 24.252.0.2, remote_port: 16464 
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192.0.2.24 2015-03-23 10:46:48 Vulnerable Service: HTTPS (FREAK) ISP  
remote_port: 443 
192.0.2.253 2015-03-23 06:25:09 Vulnerable Service: HTTPS (FREAK) ISP
 remote_port: 443, data: 203.213.248.253 
192.0.2.59 2015-03-23 07:45:48 Vulnerable Service: HTTPS (FREAK) ISP
 remote_port: 443, data: localdomain 
192.0.2.58 2015-03-22 06:51:26 Vulnerable Service: HTTPS (FREAK) ISP
 remote_port: 443 
192.0.2.207 2015-03-23 10:58:26 Vulnerable Service: HTTPS (FREAK) ISP
 remote_port: 443, data: localdomain 
192.0.2.7 2015-03-23 07:28:40 Vulnerable Service: HTTPS (FREAK) ISP
 remote_port: 443 
192.0.2.33 2015-03-23 05:43:56 Spam: Sender ISP data: HELOs as destination 
server 
192.0.2.136 2015-03-23 11:30:54 Vulnerable Service: HTTPS (FREAK) ISP
 remote_port: 443, data: localdomain 
192.0.2.49 2015-03-24 14:29:08 Spam: Sender ISP data: Broken HELO 
bzckbackbdzkdhcad:bzckbackbdzkdheez:bzckbackbdzkdhgba:bzckbackbdzkdhgbd:bz
ckbackbdzkdhgfc 
192.0.2.39 2015-03-24 15:49:00 Spam: Sender ISP data: Broken HELO 
bzckbackbdzkchaza:bzckbackbdzkchazg 
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 Appendix 3—Example of 
content for AISI portal 
This appendix includes three snapshots of the AISI portal—two examples of 
dashboard views and an example of an incident.  
Figure 1:  Example of dashboard view  
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Figure 2:  Example of dashboard view—overview of incidents  
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Figure 3:  Example of incident  
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Figure 4:  Screenshot of AISI updates 
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Appendix 4—Research 
methodology and sampling  
Methodology 
Personal telephone interviews were conducted with 24 randomly selected AISI 
participants between 23 February and 27 March 2015. These 24 were selected from a 
stratified list of the 82 AISI members who received compromised computer reports 
from the ACMA in early 2015. 
Although randomly selected, the sample size of 24 is too small to be statistically 
representative of all AISI participants. The results in this report provide an indication of 
how a broad cross-section of small, medium and large internet providers and 
universities use the AISI reports.  
Telephone interviews were chosen as the most appropriate research methodology 
because they allow for a detailed and comprehensive exploration of the research 
topics. This methodology was also chosen due to lessons learned from telephone and 
survey research that has previously been undertaken with AISI participants. An 
interview guide of the issues to be explored was developed to help capture the 
required information and to allow a flexible line of questioning. Three interviewers took 
part in teleconference calls for the first few interviews to ensure a common 
understanding of the research topics. Appendix 5 provides the interview guide used for 
this research. 
Interviews were undertaken by ACMA staff in the Research and Analysis section 
(RAS) with assistance from Internet Security Programs section (ISPS), which 
administers the AISI program. The research project has been developed in close 
consultation between RAS and the Unsolicited Communications branch of the ACMA. 
An email was sent to all AISI participants before the interviews to provide information 
about the research and to foreshadow that some participants would be contacted for a 
phone interview. 
Interviewees were predominantly from managerial and technical areas that had 
varying levels of knowledge about, and interactions with, customers. Many appeared 
to have a very good understanding of their customers but some were not involved with 
customers on a day-to-day basis. Each interview took approximately 30 minutes, and 
ranged from 20 minutes to as long as one hour. 
Selection of interview participants 
The AISI participants interviewed were selected randomly from a list of all AISI 
participants that was stratified to ensure coverage of small, medium and large ICT 
businesses, as well as universities. 
Small, medium and large businesses were defined on the basis of the number of 
infections usually reported for each participant organisation (Table 4). Researchers 
made a general assumption that the number of cases reported generally reflects the 
number of clients or customers and the general size of the provider organisation. 
Universities have been treated as a separate category and generally received fewer 
than 10 reports per day. 
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While the research findings are not representative of the issues faced and practices 
adopted by all AISI participants, they do cover the views of a broad range of AISI 
participants of different internet business types and organisation sizes across 
Australia. The organisations selected in the interview sample operate from most states 
in Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, and include companies that provide 
national services. Table 4 also shows the number of providers interviewed compared 
with the AISI participants. 
Table 4: Comparison of interviewed sample with AISI participants 
Size of internet provider  
(categorised by the number of 
compromises reported per day) 
AISI 
participants 
who received 
reports 
Interview 
sample 
 Number % Number % 
Small (up to 20 cases reported per day) 39 48 9 37 
Medium (21–599 cases reported per day) 24 29 5 21 
Large (600–5,000 cases reported per day) 6 7 5 21 
University (usually <10 cases reported per day) 13 16 5 21 
TOTAL 82 100 24 100 
Note: Despite the random selection of the total interview sample, a sample of 24 is too small to be 
statistically representative of all AISI participants who received compromised computer reports. The results 
in this report provide an indication of how a range of internet providers used the AISI reports. 
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Appendix 5—Interview guide for 
the 2015 AISI research 
Telephone interviews with internet service providers—key discussion topics 
and questions for the person who knows most about malware infections (incl. 
use of AISI reports) and related customer assistance. 
1. Methods and practices used by providers to deal with malware infections 
that affect their customer/user network 
> What, if anything, does your company/university do to detect malware on your 
customer network?  
PROBE to understand the different methods and sources used, including 
whether AISI reports are used, and the extent that AISI reports are relied upon 
in the mix.  
> Do you do anything to restrict spam or emails with malicious content from 
entering or leaving your customer network?   
PROBE for details as needed. 
> Does your company/university provide any general information to your 
customers/users about how to minimise the impact of malware on their 
computer/s? 
o What type of information?  Where do you provide that information? 
2. Use of, and action taken on, the daily AISI reports and/or data downloads 
from the AISI Portal 
> Does your company/university use the daily AISI reports?  
o Are the reports received via email or do you download the reports from 
the AISI Portal?  
o Are you aware of the AISI Portal?  
> What do you do with the information in the daily AISI reports—how do you 
process the information? 
PROBE FULLY for details about how the daily AISI reports are processed 
internally. 
o Are your processes automated, manual or a mix of both? 
o Do you experience any difficulties using the AISI data? What 
difficulties? 
 is it easy to identify your customers from the information in the 
AISI reports? What are the difficulties (if any)? 
 do you use static and dynamic IP addresses for different 
customers? Why are they allocated in this way? 
> Does your company/university offer mobile data services? IF IT DOES: Do you 
notify users of these mobile data services if a malware infection is detected on 
the service?  
> Can you think of any ways that the daily AISI reports could be improved? 
PROBE FULLY for ideas and details about possible improvements that would 
assist ISPs/universities to assist their customers/users. 
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IF AISI PORTAL USED:  
> What are your experiences with the new AISI Portal? What data have you 
used from the Portal? How useful is it? Any difficulties or problems? Can it be 
improved in any way?  
IF AISI REPORTS NOT USED:  
> Can you tell me the reasons why your company/university does not make use 
of the daily AISI reports?  
PROBE for reasons 
3. Actions taken to inform and assist customers deal with malware infections 
detected on their computer/s 
> What, if any, follow-up actions does your company/university take to assist 
customers/users deal with malware detected on their computing devices?  
PROBE FULLY for details of the steps and actions taken to assist customers 
resolve infections on their computer/s, including information, advice and 
assistance.  
o Is the same information and assistance offered to all customers e.g. 
between corporate and residential customers? IF IT DIFFERS: Why 
does it differ?  
> Can you give a rough estimate of the proportion of data in the daily reports 
that is used to inform customers of compromises? Why is this? 
o Are some compromises notified to customers/users and not others? 
Why is that? 
o Does assistance vary with the number or severity of the compromises 
detected?  
o How often do you notify customers/users about compromises. For 
instance, is it everyday, weekly, fortnightly? 
> Are any steps taken to promote confidence that the advice given of a 
malware infection is an authentic communication from your 
company/university? 
> Can you estimate the proportion of your customers/users that have 
experienced malware infections over the last month? 
4. Whether these cyber security and related customer assistance practices 
have changed in the last two or three years (since AISI research was 
previously undertaken in early 2012) 
> Have the internal practices used to identify malicious threats changed in the 
last two or three years? 
> Has the assistance provided to customers/users changed in the last two or 
three years? How has it changed?  Why has it changed? 
5. The nature of customer feedback after they have been contacted about 
malware incidents 
> Do you receive much customer feedback when you contact them about 
compromised computing devices? What is the nature of that feedback? Is it 
mostly positive or negative? 
> Do you know the extent to which problems are fixed by customers/users? 
> Do customers request more information?  what type/s of further information 
is requested? 
> To what extent are customers/users unresponsive or resistant to advice? 
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6. Reporting of significant cyber security risks to external authorities 
> Do you keep internal records to track malware infections on your network?  
> Does your organisation share or report information about malicious activity to 
any other organisations or external authorities?  Which organisations and 
authorities? 
o how regularly does this happen? 
o do you know the external authority to report significant cyber security 
risks to?  
7. Improvements to the AISI and additional Government assistance that would 
help deal with malware and other cyber security threats 
> Besides the AISI program that is run by the ACMA, can you think of other 
ways the Government could work with industry to address malware risks and 
cyber attacks? 
> Before we finish, is there anything else you would like to add about the things 
we have been talking about? 
PROBE as necessary for details 
For the ACMA’s purpose only, record: name of contact, company or educational 
institution; and whether the ISP is small, medium or large. 
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Appendix 6—Detailed findings 
for large ISPs 
Practices and process 
All five large ISPs interviewed use AISI data to varying degrees to deal with malware 
infections on their customer networks. 
Two large ISPs only make limited use of AISI data: 
 for one, use of the data is at the ‘early design stages’ and it is developing a policy 
about how to use this data 
 another only uses the AISI portal to explore and search malware incidents against 
customer IP addresses when they become aware of an issue. 
Three of the five large ISPs actively use the emailed AISI daily reports in their 
management of malware. One further ISP had previously used the now-defunct 
Repeated sightings report with an automated set-up.11  
Four of the five large ISPs interviewed have used the AISI portal. The one large ISP 
that does not use the portal has an internal system in place that already captures 
malware threats from different sources, including the daily email reports. One ISP is 
using the portal to concentrate on customers who are repeatedly affected, pulling data 
on repeatedly affected customers, date, time and type of infection from the portal into 
its system.  
The AISI daily reports are not the only method large ISPs use to detect malware 
infections; they tend to use a number of different sources to help identify malware on 
their customer network. As one ISP puts it, ‘it is the bread and butter work of any ISP 
to protect and manage its network’. Three of the large ISPs currently use an 
automated or semi-automated system to provide alerts to their customers about their 
malware infections. One further ISP is considering using the daily AISI data from the 
portal if internal funding becomes available. 
Approach to malware infections 
Large ISPs tend to have diverse approaches to dealing with malware infections, 
whether they are identified from AISI data or other sources. These include:  
 concentrating on repeated incidents or trends over a number of days—this usually 
indicates customers with no antivirus or out-of-date anti-malware protection 
software 
 providing general advice and assistance to customers who are affected by malware 
viruses 
 suspending accounts that have been compromised—to prompt customers to call 
the customer service desk so they can be advised of the malware infection 
                                                     
11 The Repeated sightings reports were discontinued in mid-2014 because equivalent (and far more 
comprehensive) data was made available through the AISI portal at this time, albeit through a different 
mechanism. These weekly reports identified IP addresses with malware infections that had been reported 
frequently over the previous fortnight. The data in the AISI portal now extends beyond one year, so 
searches can be undertaken of repeated reports of IP addresses for any given period and the results 
downloaded from the portal. 
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 letting customers know straight away—however, if a customer asks not to be 
contacted about malware anymore, a note is made not to call that customer.  
All of the large ISPs interviewed are concerned about the perception of spamming 
their customers and tend to limit their email contacts with them. One large ISP, for 
example, only sends emails to affected customers on a fortnightly basis, although it 
uses the data internally on a weekly basis: 
We send an email to affected customers on a fortnightly basis (not more regularly). We use 
the data weekly internally. We don’t want to overwhelm customers or spam people. 
(Large ISP) 
Difficulties and improvements 
Using the AISI report does not seem to present any major difficulties for large ISPs.  
One ISP likes that the formatting of the AISI report has remained consistent, while the 
more detailed and targeted information makes its messaging to customers more 
consistent and substantial:  
We are happy with the AISI report. The formatting of the AISI reports is consistent which is 
good. The information is getting richer. There is more explanation of specific events and 
details per event. [Also the report has changed in the last month or so.] The details provided 
in the reports make our messaging to customers more consistent and fuller also. (Large ISP) 
One large ISP is concerned that approaching customers about a malware infection 
without overwhelming them with too much extra information is a delicate balance. 
When asked about areas of possible improvements for the AISI, large ISPs made a 
number of suggestions, both on providing more information and using a different 
format.  
Suggestions for content 
One large ISP has difficulties reconciling all the data to all customers. 
Two large ISPs note that having the source port information in the reports is critical, 
but that this information is not always available in the reports. In cases where there are 
many network users behind a given IP address, the source port can help identify the 
individual computing device that is infected. 
Suggestions for format 
Rather than a portal, one large ISP suggested having a consumer web system that 
gathers information directly from the web service into a threat management system. 
Another suggestion was to have a more user-friendly, self-help website to help 
consumers identify what to do and enable them to search for more information on 
specific malware infections.  
One ISP commented that there is insufficient information on the website about 
particular infection types and that it does not appear to keep up with changes reflected 
in the AISI reports. It advocated updating the AISI website with the most current 
information from the AISI reports. 
Suggestions for improving how government helps with malware infections 
When asked for possible improvements in how government helps with malware 
infections (outside of the AISI reports), two of the five large ISPs recommended 
consolidating the number of agencies dealing with cybersecurity. Having multiple 
agencies can be confusing and, according to one ISP, there is a real lack of 
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coordination on cybersecurity and public messaging in this area. That ISP pointed to a 
need for a whole-of-government approach to coordinate information and activities: 
The number of agencies that deal with cybersecurity issues can be confusing. (Large ISP) 
There is a real lack of government coordination on cybersecurity and public messaging in 
this area [the way government assists malware infections]. (Large ISP)  
There was also a concern that government and industry are not sufficiently preparing 
for the future: 
We don’t have the basic ‘stuff’ such as anti-virus software, so what about smart fridges and 
smart cars in the future? (Large ISP) 
Information and feedback  
To prevent viruses occurring and inform customers about malware infections, most 
large ISPs provide general information on internet security on their website, with 
questions and answers on different security topics. However, one ISP’s approach is to 
simply direct its customers to the ACMA’s AISI website for more information. 
Over-the-phone help is generally provided as part of a normal help-desk function, with 
no dedicated team to advise on cybersecurity issues. Customer care staff usually deal 
with these issues; however, their limited knowledge about how to address malware 
viruses and related concerns means they can only provide general guidance, and 
cannot help customers remove malware. Staff will often suggest that customers seek 
an independent ICT technician’s advice. One large ISP has a separate business line, 
offering technicians who can provide immediate action to help with malware 
infection—but at a cost.  
One large ISP handles government and corporate clients separately, as they require 
different support to residential customers. Government and corporate clients usually 
have their own IT team to deal with malware viruses and related problems. Identifying 
affected customers can be an issue for businesses using many computing devices.  
Large ISPs receive various type of customer feedback—both positive and negative.  
 one ISP does not receive much feedback at all 
 three ISPs perceive that, in general, customers don’t like being contacted, even in 
cases where the report is about a malware infection on their service 
 one ISP says its customers are grateful for notifications about malware on their 
network and happy to be contacted—many of its customers are not technically 
knowledgeable and have no idea that an infection/virus is on their system.  
Overall, there are various types of feedback from customers:  
 disbelief that the ISP is contacting them 
 hostility and resentment that the ISP is monitoring their data  
 appreciation that the ISP is helping them 
 wanting to be left alone—‘I don’t care’ attitude. 
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Proportion of malware infections 
Most large ISPs have a small proportion of customers affected by malware infections. 
One large ISP notes that high traffic on its network does not equate to an increase in 
malware infections. Another has done some analysis and is surprised by the very low 
percentage of customers affected by malware infections. However, three of the five 
large ISPs interviewed suspect not all infected customers are detected in the AISI 
reports.12 
Large ISPs don’t necessarily know the extent to which malware infections are resolved 
by customers, although two ISPs have a lot of customers repeatedly affected by 
malware infections. One ISP has a threshold in place for customers that are 
repeatedly affected—notifying a customer up to three or four times in six months 
before they leave that customer alone. Generally, ISPs try not to annoy customers 
who just want to be left alone. One ISP had tried to contact customers by phone when 
they saw three reports over six weeks but stopped because this practice was 
associated with scam phone calls. 
Changes  
When asked about changes to cybersecurity and related customer assistance 
practices that have occurred over the past two to three years, large ISPs mentioned 
either continual improvements or refinements of systems in place, or no changes but 
plans for the future. This included:  
 Implementing a total malware solution in response to AISI—including systems and 
practices to handle the AISI reports, and customer care agents to notify customers 
and comply with a voluntary code of practice. Every time the ISP’s network 
changes, there are rolling changes to this malware solution. 
 Implementing a service that enables parents to manage internet access during 
certain times of the days—for example, they can block sites so children don’t go 
online during homework time. 
 Working on a solution to collect and analyse information from the portal ‘on the fly’, 
and to identify a trigger to collect further information from the portal. 
 Trialling outbound phone calls to customers affected by malware for six months—
however the number of people taking advice was very small, so email has 
remained the main contact.  
 Stopping plans to utilise other data sources that identify malware infections—the 
AISI reports already include this information. 
Among plans for the future, another large ISP is considering a service that alerts 
customers of phishing activity. However, this ISP is aware that some customers may 
associated such a service with ‘surveillance’ activities. 
                                                     
12 The ACMA makes no claim that the AISI data identifies all infected customers—in fact, the number of 
infections the AISI identifies is probably only a small proportion of the total number of infections on 
Australian networks. 
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Records and reporting  
None of the large ISPs interviewed provided information about tracking malware 
infections that occur on their network.  
In terms of reporting to government organisations, the five large ISPs have different 
approaches: 
 Three ISPs indicated they talked to CERT Australia on a regular to occasional 
basis. 
 One ISP is part of the Critical infrastructure Group in the Attorney-General’s 
Department, an information-sharing forum between carriers, utilities and major 
retail that convenes to discuss information on their networks two or three times a 
year. It shares information and incidences that occur on its network.  
 Another large ISP initiates contact with CERT Australia on a needs basis—for 
example, reporting of Russian spam campaigns. 
 Two of the large ISPs have infrequent and ad hoc discussions with CERT 
Australia. 
Interviewees did not spontaneously mention any other government organisations. 
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Appendix 7—Detailed findings 
for medium ISPs 
Practices and process 
All of the five medium ISPs interviewed use the AISI daily email reports.  
Only two of them were aware of the AISI portal—one had not used it very often, the 
other not at all. The other three ISPs were not aware of the portal. However, when the 
interviewer explained more about the portal, two showed interest, particularly in its 
ability to automate the process of dealing with malware infections.  
The five medium ISPs interviewed use a mix of manual and automated processes to 
deal with the daily AISI reports: 
 Three have a manual process in place and, for two of them, the daily AISI report is 
the main source used to identify malware infections and botnets: 
 One uses the information in the daily reports to pick up on repeat reports and 
inform customers about infections every week or fortnight.  
 The others relay all the information in the AISI daily reports by getting in 
touch with affected customers. These ISPs alert affected customers to the 
fact that they have a virus and advise of the action to be taken.  
 Two have automatic processes in place: 
 One ISP has developed software for their residential customers that 
identifies affected customers from the AISI reports. The information is then 
made available to technical support who contact customers via phone and 
follow up by email. 
 The other ISP has a fully automated process whereby AISI information goes 
into a drop-box and is automatically sent via email to affected customers. 
This email informs customers that they are affected by malware and asks 
them to contact customer service. 
The AISI daily reports are not the only method medium ISPs use to detect malware 
infections. While three of the five medium ISPs interviewed mostly rely on the daily 
AISI reports, two ISPs use other sources, including in-house spam and automated 
abuse detection systems. Reports generated by these detection systems are used in 
association with AISI reports, which are useful in providing confirmation of the IP 
addresses the ISP has separately identified as sending spam. Three of the medium 
ISPs mentioned that their email and spam filtering systems are a key area of focus 
and a priority for their business.  
Another ISP uses reports from AusCERT13 and general information from blogs such as 
AUSNOG14, SAGE and others as sources of information on malware infections. ISPs 
also detect malware infections through direct customer contact reporting slow traffic 
occurring on the network.  
One ISP also identifies training as a source of prevention.  
                                                     
13 AusCERT provides reports of infections associated with given IP addresses. 
14 Blogs such as AUSNOG provide general information about malware infections that are prevalent at a 
given point in time. 
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Approach to malware infections 
Medium ISPs have diverse approaches to dealing with their customers’ malware 
infections:  
 One medium ISP identifies affected customers using the AISI daily report, and then 
notifies them about the malware infection via phone or email. All the information in 
the AISI report is passed on. A large customer team of approximately 10 callers is 
available for this. This ISP’s service desk staff doesn’t provide advice over the 
phone about how to remove the malware infection, as they don’t have the 
expertise.  
 Similarly, another medium ISP notifies affected customers by phone or email, and 
provides generic information on how to resolve malware infections (such as 
reference sites and links where they can get further information). Customers are 
emailed and phoned a total of three times. After that, if the problem continues to 
show up on AISI reports, the customers are just notified by email. At that stage, it is 
considered the customer’s responsibility to solve the problem.  
 Another medium ISP waits until a large number of problems or a trend is identified 
on its customer network, and then sends an email to affected customers with fact 
sheets and information on how to manage the problem. Customers with malware 
infections are either blocked or suspended until they do a full scan and remove the 
malware.  
 Another ISP will send an email to affected customers with only basic information in 
order not to confuse them, and ask them to contact customer service. Customers 
do usually contact the ISP. If they ignore the email and remain on the affected 
customers list for a month, the ISP tries to assist over the phone. 
 Another ISP contacts affected customers by email to advise them they have a virus 
and of the action to be taken; these customers are also given a copy of the initial 
AISI report. Customers are given a couple of days before the ISP starts following 
up to make sure they understand what it means. If no action is taken, the ISP will 
follow up again and refer to terms and conditions for the use of their network. 
Difficulties and improvements 
Generally, the use of the AISI report does not seem to present any major difficulties. 
However, three of the five medium ISPs interviewed mentioned the following issues: 
 Perception that some symptoms of malware infection are not currently covered by 
the AISI report—such as spam, infected routers15 and infected telephone 
adapters.16  
 AISI report information can be too technical for customers to understand. 
 Given the high number of reports received for residential customers, one of the 
medium ISPs finds it challenging to action all of them. That ISP has elected to 
focus on repeat malware infections.  
                                                     
15 Spam-infected bots and infected/vulnerable routers are already included in AISI reports. 
16 USB chargers and other devices could theoretically be an infection vector but the ACMA has no evidence 
this has occurred. 
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When asked about possible improvements to the AISI daily reports, one medium ISP 
mentioned that AISI reports don’t cover DDoS attacks—this would be a possible 
improvement as they are currently experiencing multiple DDoS attacks every hour.17 
When asked for possible improvements in how government helps with malware 
infections (outside of the AISI reports), three of the five medium ISPs suggested the 
provision of:  
 information on emerging/upcoming malware infection threats, which would allow 
ISPs to manage and prepare for major attacks before the problem gets too big. 
This could be delivered in the form of a monthly report or newsletter 
 information on problems with customers’ routers and telephone adaptors 
 further education and awareness-raising programs for citizens about malware risks 
and cyber-attacks.  
Information and feedback  
To prevent viruses occurring, medium ISPs inform and help customers with malware 
infections in a variety of ways. This includes providing: 
 general information on internet security and recommendations for use of their 
network (two of the five medium ISPs interviewed) 
 general guides about malware infections including information from AISI reports on 
their website (three of the five medium ISPs interviewed). 
Another source of information was ISPs’ customer service or technical support teams, 
who give customers reference sites and links where they can find more information on 
how to resolve and prevent malware. For one medium ISP, its biggest issue is that 
customers don’t know how to solve the problem, so it provides some help over the 
phone, as well as a list of IT specialists with whom they have good relationships that 
customers can contact if they need further assistance. Another ISP mentioned the 
importance of education and staff training on malware infections, highlighting the need 
to continually educate their customer service staff on malware issues.  
Two of the medium ISPs handle both residential and business customers. One has a 
lot of malware infection reports for its residential customer and so must deal with 
notifications of the AISI daily reports differently for those. A higher level of support is 
delivered for business and corporate customers; for residential customers, the ISP 
waits to send notifications until bigger problems or trends emerge.  
For another medium ISP, the same—limited—level of assistance is offered to both 
residential and business customers. However, its business customers have their own 
internal IT assistance to deal with malware infection notifications, and so requires less 
support from the ISP. 
Medium ISPs did not comment much on the nature of their customer feedback, but 
overall seem to receive both positive and negative feedback.  
Two medium ISPs mentioned that customers sometimes question or deny the 
malware advice/notification and ask for further evidence. When this occurs, the ISP 
                                                     
17 Some sources of DDoS activity are reported through the AISI, such as open resolvers, which can be 
associated with DDoS attacks. Most of these DDoS attacks will be from IP addresses that are not located on 
a given ISP’s network—that is, attacks are being made from infected or misconfigured devices on other 
networks. The appropriate government organisation for advice on DDoS mitigation strategies on Australian 
networks is CERT Australia. 
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provides the AISI report and mentions that the information comes from the ACMA, an 
authoritative government source.  
Three medium ISPs mentioned that customers are usually thankful that customer 
service or technical support has taken the time to contact them and help solve the 
problem. One ISP mentioned:  
99 per cent [of] customers were happy to hear … the notification as they wanted to be good 
network citizens and for the issues to be resolved. Very few customers were unresponsive. 
(Medium ISP) 
Proportion of malware infections 
At four of the five medium ISPs, only a small proportion of customers is affected by 
malware infections—three estimated this proportion at under one per cent.  
A couple of medium ISPs interviewed also mentioned that while a lot of their 
residential customers are affected, they see a lower number of malware infections for 
their business/corporate customers. No estimate for the proportion of customers with 
malware infections was provided. 
Changes  
When asked about changes to cybersecurity and related customer assistance 
practices that have occurred over the past two to three years, three of the medium 
ISPs mentioned improvements or refinements of the systems in place: 
 One had started using the AISI reports in 2013 and had become more proactive in 
dealing with customers’ malware infections as a result.  
 Another had developed automatic processes and was now looking at having a 
rolling five to 10 days use of IP addresses. That ISP also mentioned Carrier Grade 
Network Address Translation (CGN), which will require the need for IP address, 
source port and IP destination address.  
 A third had improved the way it relays information to customers. Although the 
practices themselves have not changed, that ISP now provides more technical 
assistance to its customer, helping resolve issues more quickly and with less 
hassle.  
One medium ISP considered there had been no changes.  
Another ISP hired a new security manager to oversee security changes, with plans to 
consolidate and improve processes in the next three years. This is considered an 
increasingly important issue for the business as the malware infection worsens.  
Records and reporting  
Two medium ISPs use their ticketing system to track information about malware 
infections, albeit in slightly different ways: 
 For one, the ticketing system is mainly used to help its approach to repeat malware 
infections—it proactively contacts these customers and guides them to resolve the 
problem. The ticketing is not used to go back and analyse data or report on 
malware infections on their network.  
 For the other, the ticketing system is mainly used to keep internal records of 
malware infections on its network, so that reports can be produced.  
One ISP does not keep track or monitor persistent malware infections that occur on its 
network, while two ISPs provide no information about tracking. 
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Only one of the five medium ISPs contacts government organisations and other 
relevant bodies about malware infections, including AusCERT, the Attorney General’s 
Department and ASIO (about intercept issues), and has contacts at multiple layers.  
The other four medium ISPs have not had to report any risks to any external agency. 
Two ISPs are aware of AusCERT and receive their reports on malware infections. One 
ISP nominated CERT Australia as the government organisation ISPs can report to if 
there is a big malware infection incident. 
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Appendix 8—Detailed findings 
for small ISPs 
Practices and process 
Eight of the nine small ISPs interviewed use the AISI daily reports received by email. 
One small ISP was not aware of the AISI daily report or the portal.   
The small ISPs mainly use manual processing, with only one having a fully automated 
system in place to process the reports and email notifications to affected customers. 
That system generates a daily summary with the number of emails sent out. 
Other small ISPs review the AISI reports manually. This involves a physical search for 
the IP address to identify and contact the affected customers, usually by email. One 
small ISP contacts customers either by email or by phone. 
Few small ISPs are using the AISI portal. One of the nine small ISPs interviewed uses 
the portal to search for more information on malware incidents if the affected customer 
requested it, but prefers using the daily email report because it goes into their ticketing 
system. Another ISP has used the portal in the past. Two small ISPs were not aware 
of the portal and were provided more information about it. The remainder of small ISPs 
were aware of the portal but do not use it.  
For four of the eight small ISPs using the daily AISI reports, these are the sole method 
of detecting malware infections on their customer network. Other small ISPs have a 
range of prevention systems in place, including: 
 traditional firewall intrusion prevention systems 
 specific packages that deal with malware detection and alerting  
 AOL and Yahoo reports 
 AusCERT reports 
 checkpoint platform—a security platform that covers anti-bot and anti-malware 
 DDoS mitigation software tools. 
Approach to malware infections 
Small ISPs have relatively similar approaches to notifying their customers of malware 
infections. Slight differences are apparent in the extent of information shared with 
customers: 
 One ISP provides quite a lot of information to affected customers, including the 
information that comes from the AISI/ACMA and the date, time, IP address and 
nature of the infection. It recommends its customers do a virus scan and update 
their operating system. Finally, it provides contact details and links to the Stay 
Smart Online website. 
 Two small ISPs invite affected customers to contact their customer service. 
 One small ISP prefers not to mention the ACMA so customers don’t think they are 
being monitored. 
The level of assistance provided to affected customers varies.  
 Three of the small ISPs provide phone help to affected customers to remove 
malware infections, including help to install antivirus software or scanning 
programs. If the problem is more complex, they suggest the customer contacts an 
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IT technician—one ISP has a few computer technicians they recommend to 
customers. 
 One small ISP with corporate clients goes to the client’s site to help remove the 
malware infection. 
 Two small ISPs with both wholesale service and managed services take a different 
approach depending on the type of customer. Customers of the managed service 
are provided a full clean-up service, whereas information in the AISI report is 
forwarded to wholesale customers so they can take action themselves.  
 For another ISP, the action taken depends on the customer—more support is given 
to big customers.  
 One small ISP offers professional ICT assistance to specific customers—for 
example, patch servers, installing a firewall.  
Only one of the nine small ISPs does not provide any help to its customers—it just 
notifies customers that they are affected by a malware infection.  
Difficulties and improvements 
For small ISPs, using the AISI report does not seem to present any major difficulties. 
One of the nine small ISPs has problems using the daily reports when insufficient data 
is provided, while another has an issue identifying the affected devices.  
Other small ISPs mentioned some areas for possible improvements, either to the 
content or format of the information provided by the AISI. 
Suggestions for content 
A small ISP said: 
Daily AISI report[s] could be improved by providing more up-to-date time stamps. Some of 
the reports have a time stamp from a few days prior. 
The same provider also queried if there is a way to check if the malware infection 
reported has been removed when the time stamp is from a few days ago. 
Another small ISP recommended that the AISI portal indicates when a report is 
completed, so that ISP knows the problem is resolved. 
Suggestions for format 
One small ISP would like to be able to automate its system so that emails can go 
directly to affected customers—for example, a .csv or an Excel file to upload to a 
server. 
Another small ISP is interested in receiving additional information and documentation 
from the ACMA that it could attach to emails to affected customers—for example, a 
two-page document with information about the malware infection, spam protection 
programs and other basic recommendations.  
One ISP suggested that information on the latest malware infections could be made 
accessible to customers on the AISI portal.18 
                                                     
18 The AISI section of the ACMA website only describes the most prevalent types of malware infections. See 
pages 19-20 for the ACMA’s response to this suggestion.  
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Suggestions for improving how government helps with malware infections 
When asked for possible improvements in how government helps with malware 
infections (outside of the AISI reports), three of the nine small ISPs interviewed 
proposed providing:  
 information on where customers go to find information on malware infections, and 
how to prevent and resolve them 
 feedback from government on serious malware infections, what has been done and 
the outcomes it achieved 
 more information on IP reputation lists—that is, blacklisted IPs.   
Information and feedback 
To help prevent malware infections on their customers’ networks, three of the nine 
small ISPs interviewed provide educational material. This includes:  
 online blogs to educate customers on how to deal with malware and encourage 
them to keep their security systems up to date 
 customer newsletters that publicise malicious content and infections to be aware 
of, and how to mitigate them  
 very basic information on their website. 
One small ISP sends information at customers’ request—for example, an urgent 
Microsoft update. 
Not all of the small ISPs commented on the nature of the feedback they receive from 
customers affected by malware infections. Of those who did: 
 Four tend to receive positive feedback—customers are grateful for the notification 
and advice provided. 
 Two do not receive any feedback because they send automatic notifications—it is 
left to the customer to resolve the problem or contact the ISP. As a result, it is hard 
for the ISP to know if the customers have acted on the report. 
 Two have had customers question the authenticity of the contact. Apple Macintosh 
users are most uncooperative because of the perception Mac computing devices 
don’t get viruses.  
Proportion of malware infections  
Only a small proportion of customers of the small ISPs are estimated to be affected by 
malware infections—fewer than one per cent of customers, with an average of 
between two and five reports per day.  
Changes 
When the small ISPs were asked about changes to cybersecurity and related 
customer assistance practices that have occurred over the past two to three years:  
 Three reported no changes.  
 Three had starting using the AISI reports and improving internal policies to detect 
and prevent malware and botnets. One of these ISPs had previously only dealt with 
the problem on a case-by-case basis when contacted by customers; another had 
only been monitoring high upload usage in its network.  
 Three mentioned continuous improvements of their IT security system with 
emphasis on education, detection and prevention. One has changed how it 
manages both internal systems and client assistance—introducing a new service 
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where it manages malware threats and attacks for its clients. Another small ISP 
has invested in checkpoint platform to improve network visibility.  
Records and reporting 
Only four of the nine small ISPs interviewed commented on whether they are tracking 
and reporting malware infection information on their networks. Two do not keep any 
records, while the other two record malware infections as part of their ticketing 
systems and can trace security issues on their network.  
In terms of reporting to government organisations, only one of the nine small ISPs has 
a security incident-handling procedure whereby it reports cybersecurity incidents to 
external authorities. For commercial customers, small ISPs work with CERT Australia; 
for government customers, with the AFP. The ISP mentioned has regular contact with 
these organisations.  
Other small ISPs had no major cybersecurity incidents to report. Three small ISPs 
would probably inform the ACMA if they had a need, while two would go to the AFP. 
One small ISP was aware of AusCERT.  
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Appendix 9—Detailed findings 
for educational institutions 
Practices and process 
All of the educational institutions interviewed use the AISI daily reports received by 
email. None used the AISI portal, and the reasons for this varied: 
 all universities are aware of the portal, but have not found value in using it—they 
consider receiving email alerts is easier than having to retrieve the information 
 one university prefers the daily email reports because it allows for everything to be 
in their ticketing system 
 one university says the portal is not part of its routine and suggests the ACMA 
sends a monthly reminder with a summary of what’s on the portal.  
Universities have computing devices that are well protected against malware and 
cybersecurity threats, and have easy access to their own IT personnel.  
The AISI daily reports are not the only methods educational institutions use to detect 
malware infections, with participants mentioning the following range of methods: 
 basic antivirus 
 endpoint antivirus 
 netflow network traffic data 
 metadata analysis 
 Shadowserver reports 
 centralised dashboards to monitor activity on the network 
 statistical tools on the network 
 visualisation tools on monitors to detect unusual activity 
 email filtering  
 intrusion detection system (IDS) 
 firewalls 
 AusCERT reports. 
Approach to malware infections 
Five of the educational institutions interviewed—four universities and one educational 
network—currently manually process the information in the daily AISI reports; one is 
looking at ways to automatically process these reports. For the universities, the small 
number of computer compromises they receive in AISI reports means a manual 
approach to processing this data is sufficient. One reason for the small number of 
reports may be the cybersecurity and malware protection measures they take to 
safeguard on-campus computer networks and systems, which are also supported by a 
team of IT personnel. 
All educational institutions interviewed tend to use the AISI reports in a similar way—to 
map it to the source port to identify what user to notify. Some educational institutions 
remove malware infection for the users or ask local IT staff to do it; others just notify 
the users and ask them to remove it.  
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Depending on categories of users—staff or students using university devices, or 
students using their own devices—educational institutions will support the user to deal 
with a malware infection. Students using their own devices are usually notified but do 
not receive support to remove the malware infection; they have to do it themselves.  
All universities interviewed provided staff and students with medium to considerable 
assistance to resolve malware problems. Central or delegated IT personnel were 
available on-site to personally help staff and residential students to fix problems. 
Affected staff are sent an initial email notification about a possible computer 
compromise and are then expected to request support from their faculty’s IT staff if 
they cannot  resolve the issue themselves.  
Students are usually notified by email of the malware infection. Some universities 
block accounts identified as having malware infections until they are cleaned. One 
university gives three notifications before locking the account.  
One university disables the affected account as the best way to make students contact 
them. These students are then directed to IT services for help removing malware and 
installing proper antivirus. That university provides a free antivirus software for staff 
and students to download onto their personal computer equipment. 
Universities also tend to address each of the compromised computer cases they 
receive. 
Difficulties and improvements 
Overall, the educational institutions are satisfied with the AISI reports—the information 
is simple and corresponds to what they need. Two universities see no need to improve 
them, while one mentioned that the reports never had a ‘false positive’ and this 
situation should remain.  
Two universities find it difficult to identify affected computing devices (as one IP 
address could represent many computing devices) or lack information on IP 
addresses—for example, the use of translated IP addresses. One university is unable 
to identify or link compromised computer listings with some students, particularly those 
using wireless devices. 
When asked, three universities had suggestions for possible improvements:  
 Two suggest adding more information or commentary in the report on how the 
infection/malware/spam is affecting its users, to decrease the time needed to 
communicate and research the malware infection internally. When universities 
pass on the information to IT support internally or to their users, having an 
authoritative source to rely on would be helpful and save time.  
 One suggests some trending analysis may be useful to provide historical 
information on the malware infection when staff go on leave.19 
When asked for possible improvements in how government helps with malware 
infections (outside of the AISI reports), one educational network suggested 
implementing a mechanism for the sector to prevent large-scale attacks, such as 
DDoS. Another suggested scanning for FREAK vulnerabilities, while one said more 
                                                     
19 Historical information is available in the AISI portal.  
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could be done to share information—for example, for government to provide analysis 
of upcoming malware risks.20  
Information and feedback  
Universities provide information about preventing malware infection in a range of 
ways. While one educational network does not provide any information as it has 
network IT specialists available to help, other universities tend to provide information 
on their website, including links to the government’s Stay Smart Online website. On 
the same page of that university website, students can also find a link to free antivirus 
software.  
The majority of the educational institutions interviewed do not always receive feedback 
from users, but when they do, it tends to be positive—users are usually quite grateful 
the malware infection has been detected. Universities do not always know if their 
users have been able to remove the malware infection, but sometimes do get 
information from the user that it has been resolved. Other times they know because it 
stops appearing in the report.  
One university has received negative feedback from users not wanting to admit their 
computer has been infected. That university had to resort to shock tactics with its 
users to get them to react. Two universities found some of their users to be 
unresponsive when contacted about malware infections. 
The educational institutions interviewed have a very small proportion of users affected 
by malware—with reported weekly infections ranging from a couple to 12–15 
infections. This represents a small proportion of the network.  
Changes  
Any changes that had occurred in the educational institutions over the past two to 
three years were in response to their external environment, requiring them to adapt or 
refine their IT security processes/practices. External changes mentioned were: 
 DDoS—one university said these had been ramping up and it needed more 
resources to respond to the problem  
 the increasing number of users using their own devices (rather than university-
supplied), which makes it more difficult to handle malware infections. 
Other universities mentioned internal incremental changes to their processes, 
including: 
 refreshing their own IT networks to provide greater network visibility 
 modifying settings in their wireless network, enabling them to reduce the infection 
rate 
 starting to use the AISI reports; for one university this was only in the past year.  
Records and reporting  
None of the educational institutions interviewed track the number of malware infections 
on their network per se. However, three are able to use their ticketing system to record 
and track the information. One university keeps records of any alerts received about 
malware and cross-reference them with new alerts. In cases of repeat incidents, they 
                                                     
20 FREAK is an SSL/TLS security vulnerability that potentially allows communications to be decrypted. The 
ACMA started reporting FREAK and other vulnerable service data through the AISI in March 2015. 
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use the information to clean malware infections on computing devices and educate the 
users.  
Educational institutions do not regularly report incidents to government organisations 
and other relevant bodies: 
 one university reports activity to CERT Australia but only infrequently (at most once 
a year) 
 one educational network has discussed becoming one of CERT Australia’s  
partners 
 one educational institution has reported DDoS attacks to the AFP 
 one educational institution reports phishing campaigns to AusCERT each time it 
happens so the phishing webpages can be removed  
 two of the five educational institutions have not have incidents that require them to 
report to external organisations 
 one university has asked a government organisation to contact a company 
overseas for notifications of malware infections.  
It is not clear whether respondents correctly distinguish between CERT Australia and 
AusCERT or use those terms interchangeably.  
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